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SEAMEN, RAILROAD EMPLOYEES, AND UBER DRIVERS?:
APPLYING THE SECTION 1 EXEMPTION IN THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT TO RIDESHARE DRIVERS
Conor Bradley*

ABSTRACT
Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or the Act) exempts “seamen,
railroad employees, [and] any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce” from arbitration. In 2019, the Supreme Court held in New
Prime Inc. v. Oliveira that this provision exempted independent contractors as
well as employees. This decision expanded the reach of the section 1 exemption and
may affect the relationship between ridesharing companies, such as Uber, and
their drivers. Previously, ridesharing companies argued that courts must enforce
the arbitration clauses in their employment contracts because their workers were
independent contractors and, therefore, section 1 was inapplicable. Since this
argument is now prohibited by the holding in New Prime, rideshare drivers have
an opportunity to avoid arbitration using the section 1 exemption. But they still
face legal difficulties because of the narrow construction of the exemption employed
by courts. This Note argues that the current interpretation of the exemption, which
focuses on the physical movement of goods across state lines, is incongruent with
the text and history of the FAA and that courts should broaden the exemption to
include rideshare drivers.
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INTRODUCTION
The “sharing” (or “platform”) economy—the system that utilizes
online platforms to connect laborers and sellers with consumers
and buyers—has drastically changed the business landscape. 1 This
disruption has come with significant legal and regulatory challenges for the companies operating within the platform economy, their
2
employees, and lawmakers. For example, ridesharing companies
3
have radically altered the transportation industry, but also faced
scrutiny regarding the way their business models avoid traditional

1. Brett Harris, Note, Uber, Lyft, and Regulating the Sharing Economy, 41 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 269, 269 (2017).
2. “Ridesharing” is defined as “a car service that allows a person to use a smartphone
app to arrange a ride in a usually privately owned vehicle.” Ridesharing, DICTIONARY.COM,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ridesharing
(last
visited
Oct.
14,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/E985-4XRP]. The rideshare industry in the United States is dominated
by Uber and Lyft. See Rani Molla, Lyft Has Eaten into Uber’s U.S. Market Share, New Data Suggest,
VOX (Dec. 18, 2018, 11:36 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/12/12/18134882/lyft-uberride-car-market-share [https://perma.cc/HT8Q-58KN] (explaining that in 2018 Uber and
Lyft comprised 98% of the consumer rideshare market in the United States). Driven by
these two companies, the industry has grown substantially since its inception in the early
2010s. One study found that the number of Uber drivers in mid-2012 was basically zero; by
2015 there were 465,000 drivers employed by Uber. Katherine G. Abraham, John
Haltiwanger, Kristin Sandusky & James Spletzer, The Rise of the Gig Economy: Fact or Fiction,
109 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 357, 359 (2019).
3. See Meet the 2018 CNBC Disruptor 50 Companies, CNBC (May 22, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/22/meet-the-2018-cnbc-disruptor-50-companies.html
[https://perma.cc/H4DB-2LB4] (ranking Uber as number two and Lyft as number five on a
list of the fifty companies whose innovations are changing the world).
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workplace laws. Indeed, numerous plaintiffs have sued Uber, one
of the leading ridesharing platforms, alleging that the company
misclassified its drivers as independent contractors, rather than
employees, to avoid paying them minimum wage and providing
5
certain benefits.
By classifying their workers as independent contractors, Uber
and other ridesharing companies also took advantage of an expansive application of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or the Act),
the federal law governing the enforceability of arbitration agree6
ments, to avoid litigating their disputes in court. Employment
contracts between rideshare platforms and their drivers often include provisions that settle disputes through private arbitration ra7
ther than the court system. Agreements to arbitrate employment
disputes are generally enforceable in both federal and state court
8
under the FAA. However, section 1 of the Act exempts “contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, [and] any other
9
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”
Rideshare companies had, sometimes successfully, argued that
their workers did not qualify under this exemption because they
are independent contractors and therefore do not operate under

4. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Kennedy, Employed by an Algorithm: Labor Rights in the On-Demand
Economy, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 987, 989 (2017).
5. Megan Rose Dickey, Uber Agrees to Pay Drivers $20 Million to Settle Independent Contract
Lawsuit, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 12, 2019, 12:17 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/03
/12/uber-agrees-to-pay-drivers-20-million-to-settle-independent-contractor-lawsuit [https://
perma.cc/B9J2-6N4V]. Suits have also been filed against other platform economy companies such as Amazon, GrubHub, Lyft, DoorDash, and Postmates. Id.
6. At the time it was drafted and passed, the FAA was known as the United States Arbitration Act. See Matthew W. Finkin, “Workers’ Contracts” Under the United States Arbitration Act:
An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 282 (referring to the Act
as the United States Arbitration Act). For clarity’s sake, however, this Note will uniformly
refer to the law as the Federal Arbitration Act.
7. For example, Uber uses an arbitration clause in its employment contract. See Capriole v. Uber Techs., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 3d 919, 923–26 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting language
from the arbitration agreement contained in Uber’s employment contracts). As a result,
more than 60,000 Uber drivers have filed arbitration claims against the company. Joel Rosenblatt, Uber Gambled on Driver Arbitration and Might Have Come Up the Loser, L.A. TIMES
(May 8, 2019, 10:22 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uber-ipo-arbitrationmiscalculation-20190508-story.html [https://perma.cc/EAY3-6J8V]. Partly because of the
increased prevalence of arbitration agreements in standard form employment contracts, the
House of Representatives passed a bill in September 2019 that would invalidate all arbitration agreements contained in employment contracts. Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal
Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019).
8. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (“To confine the scope of the
Act to arbitrations sought to be enforced in federal courts would frustrate what we believe
Congress intended to be a broad enactment appropriate in scope to meet the large problems Congress was addressing.”).
9. 9 U.S.C. § 1. This Note will refer to this provision as “the exemption,” “the section 1
exemption,” and “the transportation worker exemption.”
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10
“contracts of employment.” But the Supreme Court in New Prime
Inc. v. Oliveira foreclosed this argument by holding that the FAA’s
section 1 exemption included independent contractors. 11
In light of New Prime, if rideshare drivers are “workers engaged
12
in . . . interstate commerce,” they qualify for the exemption. But
the Supreme Court has held that this provision only applies to
13
“transportation workers.” And most lower courts have adopted a
narrow definition of this term that excludes rideshare drivers, cre14
ating a legal hurdle for these workers even after New Prime.
This Note argues that courts should adopt a broader definition
of “transportation worker” that includes rideshare drivers within
the section 1 exemption. Part I provides a general overview of the
FAA’s history as it relates to the exemption. Part II more specifically analyzes the doctrinal development of the section 1 exemption
and concludes that the narrow construction of the statutory language unnecessarily excludes rideshare drivers. Part III proposes a
broader interpretation that includes rideshare drivers and aligns
the exemption with the text and legislative history of the FAA.

I. HISTORY OF THE SECTION 1 EXEMPTION
Section 2 of the FAA, the law’s main substantive provision,
makes written arbitration agreements in contracts “evidencing a
transaction involving commerce . . . valid, irrevocable and enforce15
able . . . .” The Supreme Court has explained that the FAA re-

10. See, e.g., Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 217 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that
Uber had previously argued that its agreement with their driver was not a contract of employment).
11. 139 S. Ct. 532, 541 (2019). In 2020, California voters passed Proposition 22 which
exempts Uber and Lyft from Assembly Bill 5—a California law that reclassified rideshare
drivers as employees. Sara Ashley O’Brien, Prop 22 Passes in California, Exempting Uber and Lyft
from Classifying Drivers as Employees, CNN BUS. (Nov. 4, 2020, 4:02 PM), https://www.
cnn.com/2020/11/04/tech/california-proposition-22/index.html [https://perma.cc
/P9FD-3E4U]. Thus, in California at least, Uber and Lyft may continue to classify their drivers as independent contractors. Id. While this development certainly matters in determining
the benefits to which rideshare drivers are entitled, whether rideshare drivers are classified
as independent contractors or employees is inconsequential for the purposes of the section
1 exemption because New Prime held that both independent contractors and employees
were covered by the exemption. 139 S. Ct. at 541.
12. See 139 S. Ct. at 541, 544 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 1).
13. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
14. See infra Sections II.A.3, II.B.
15. 9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Contr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24 (1983). More fully, section 2 states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
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quires courts to resolve disputes about the scope of an arbitration
16
agreement in favor of arbitration. Despite this, section 1 of the
FAA, which generally defines terms relevant to the Act, states that
“nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment
of seaman, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en17
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” This clause exempts
certain contracts from the FAA, prohibiting arbitration in those
contexts.
Section I.A traces the historical underpinnings of the FAA and
the insertion of the exemption into the Act. Section I.B provides a
brief summary of the main Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting the FAA to place the subsequent discussion of the section 1
exemption in Parts II and III in context.
A. Legislative History of the Section 1 Exemption
At the turn of the twentieth century, arbitration was a common
18
practice in the United States. Nevertheless, arbitration encoun19
tered various legal obstacles during this period. The most important weakness of the law governing early arbitration was its “relative lack of enforceability of . . . agreements before an award was
20
made.” Courts considered agreements to arbitrate future disputes
21
revocable at any time. This meant that courts “would not stay [a
judicial] action or suit pending arbitration,” even if the parties had
22
previously agreed to arbitrate the dispute.
As arbitration became more prevalent, reformers pushed for
statutory remedies to combat this “rule of revocability” pertaining
23
to agreements to arbitrate future disputes. In 1920, New York besave upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2.
16. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25. Indeed, the Court has explained that
the FAA “declare[s] a national policy favoring arbitration.” Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
17. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
18. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION – NATIONALIZATION –
INTERNATIONALIZATION 15 (1992).
19. Id. at 19–20.
20. See id. at 20.
21. WESLEY A. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS § 15, at 45 (1930) (“It
is an elementary proposition of the common law cases, and is almost universally accepted by
the American courts, that future disputes clauses and provisions for arbitration are
revocable.”).
22. MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 20.
23. Id. at 25–30. Julius Henry Cohen and Charles Bernheimer led the reformist movement. Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 302 (2015). Both
men worked for the New York State Chamber of Commerce. Id. Bernheimer was the chair of
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came the first state to enact such a law. The New York legislature
made “written contract[s] to settle a controversy thereafter arising . . . valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds
24
as exist at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.” After
the success in New York, reformers advocated for similar changes
25
in other states and on the national level. This push culminated in
the FAA’s enactment.
The American Bar Association’s Committee on Commerce,
Trade and Commercial Law (the Committee) largely handled the
drafting of the FAA. The drafting process was formally initiated at
26
the ABA’s annual meeting in 1920. In 1922, the Committee reported to the ABA general body that it had finished drafting a federal arbitration statute as part of a proposed package including a
27
uniform state arbitration statute and an international treaty. The
Committee opined that the package would “put the United States
in the forefront in this procedural reform,” promoting commercial
ethics, reducing litigation, speeding the resolution of disputes, and
28
conserving judicial resources. After adoption by the ABA, the
draft federal statute was introduced in both chambers of the Sixty29
Seventh Congress in December 1922.
The bill’s treatment of labor disputes sparked criticism from two
interested parties. First, the International Seamen’s Union adopted
30
two resolutions against the federal arbitration bill. The Union’s
President saw the bill as a mechanism for the reintroduction of in31
voluntary labor. He predicted that the bill would “take away from
all citizens except those who have the knowledge and the money to
hire the best of lawyers and who can afford to wait, the present
32
right to a day in court.” Second, Senator Thomas Sterling of
South Dakota raised concerns based on a letter he received from
one of his constituents, a lawyer who worked for one of the largest
33
firms in the state. The lawyer’s firm had “significant clients involved in interstate transportation,” including several large railroad
the organization’s arbitration committee. Id. Cohen was the general counsel and a member
of the ABA’s Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law. Id.
24. MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 35.
25. Id. at 34–47.
26. 43 A.B.A. Rep. 75 (1920); see also IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF
MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 104 (2013).
27. 45 A.B.A. Rep. 293–95 (1922).
28. Id. at 295.
29. See 67 Cong. Rec. 732, 797 (1922) (noting the introduction of H.R. 13522 and S.
4214 “to make valid and enforceable written provisions or agreements for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts . . .”).
30. SZALAI, supra note 26, at 132; Finkin, supra note 6, at 284.
31. SZALAI, supra note 26, at 132; Finkin, supra note 6, at 284.
32. Seamen Condemn Arbitration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1923, at 21.
33. SZALAI, supra note 26, at 132–35.
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companies, and he expressed concerns about the applicability of
the proposed legislation to labor disputes involving interstate
34
commerce.
A subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee addressed
the concerns about the inclusion of labor in the proposed arbitration statute at a hearing in January 1923. At that hearing, W.H.H
Piatt, the chairman of the ABA Committee that drafted the bill,
testified that:
It was not the intention of this bill to make an industrial arbitration in any sense; and so I suggest that in as far as the
committee is concerned, if your honorable committee
should feel that there is any danger of that, they should add
to the bill the following language, “but nothing herein contained shall apply to seamen or any class of workers in interstate and foreign commerce.” It is not intended that this
35
shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all.
In a similar vein, the hearing record contained a letter from then36
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover. In the letter, Hoover
advocated for passing the FAA, pointing to the New York Arbitration Act’s ability to relieve congestion within the New York court
37
system. But he also recognized the objection to the “inclusion of
38
workers’ contracts in the law’s scheme.” Thus, he recommended
that the following language be added to the proposed bill: “but
nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en39
gaged in interstate or foreign commerce.” This language differed
from Piatt’s proposed exemption in two ways. First, Hoover’s suggestion included railroad employees and, second, his language
used the phrase “engaged in interstate . . . commerce,” rather than
40
“in interstate . . . commerce.”

34. Id.
35. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 79 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Hearings] (statement of W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman, A.B.A. Comm’n).
36. Id. at 14; see also Finkin, supra note 6, at 297. Indeed, Hoover was a proponent of the
legislation because “arbitration fit perfectly with Hoover’s philosophy of industrial selfgovernance and the elimination of waste.” SZALAI, supra note 26, at 108.
37. 1923 Hearings, supra note 35, at 14.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Although this choice of language may not have mattered to anyone at the time, see
Finkin, supra note 6, at 297, the decision to use the phrase “engaged . . . in commerce”
would matter for future interpretations of the Act. See infra Sections I.B, II.A.
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The bill did not receive any hearings in the House and was never
reported out of committee in either chamber during the Sixty41
Seventh Congress. In the meantime, the ABA Committee made
42
one substantive change to the draft bill. In section 1 of the bill,
the Committee adopted Hoover’s suggested language and inserted
“but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
43
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” This is the language
44
of the section 1 exemption today. The ABA general body approved the draft of the bill containing the exemption language at
its annual meeting in 1923, and the bill became law with very few
45
changes in 1925.
B. Switch from Procedure to Substance
For most of the first thirty-five years of the FAA’s existence, the
Supreme Court viewed the FAA as resting on Congress’s constitutional power to regulate federal court procedure. 46 In the 1960s,
however, the Supreme Court’s understanding of the FAA’s consti47
tutional underpinnings began to change. The Court started to
apply the FAA as substantive law under Congress’s power to regu48
late commerce. This doctrinal change culminated in Allied-Bruce

41. MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 91. The bill did not progress out of committee in either
chamber because of the “lateness of the session and the pressure of other important business.” 46 A.B.A. Rep. 287 (1923). Nonetheless, the ABA received the assurance of “hearty
cooperation in pressing the bill to passage in the next Congress” from the sponsors of the
bill in both chambers. Id.
42. MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 91.
43. 46 A.B.A. Rep. 287 (1923); see also MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 91. In its report, the
Committee stated that this change was made “[i]n order to eliminate th[e] opposition” of
the International Seamen’s Union. 46 A.B.A. Rep. 287 (1923). Indeed, after the exemption
was inserted in 1923, one of the leading proponents of the bill, Charles Bernheimer, stated
that “we are not . . . convinced that it would not be in the interests of labor to have them
included.” SZALAI, supra note 26, at 153. Even so, he conceded that “all industrial questions
have been eliminated” in order to appease labor’s concerns. Id.
44. See 9 U.S.C. § 1.
45. See MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 91, 101.
46. Id. at 148. This understanding of the law was consistent with the intent of the drafters. See H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 1 (1924) (“Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be
enforced or not is a question is a question of procedure . . . .”); see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202–03 (1956) (holding that under the Erie doctrine, state
law applicable to arbitration governed an arbitration agreement in a contract relating to
intrastate commerce).
47. See MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 148–49.
48. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967)
(“[I]t is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined
to the incontestable federal foundations of ‘control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.’”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
(holding that the FAA creates substantive law applicable in both state and federal court);
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Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, where the Court held that the words “involving commerce” in section 2 of the FAA “signal[ed] an intent to
49
exercise Congress’ commerce power to the full.”
The shift in FAA jurisprudence had implications for the interpretation of the section 1 exemption. The decision in Allied-Bruce
indicated that the FAA’s reach was coextensive with the Congress’s
commerce power. If this principle were applied to the section 1
exemption, it would mean that nearly every employment contract
50
was ineligible for arbitration under the FAA. The federal courts of
appeals eventually split as to whether the FAA applied to employ51
ment contracts at all. In 2001, the Supreme Court in Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams held that only some employment contracts
were exempted from the FAA.52 The Court reasoned that the
phrase “engaged in commerce” in section 1 was “understood to
have a more limited reach” than the phrase “involving commerce”
53
in section 2. The Court further concluded that the section 1
phrase “any other class of workers engaged . . . in interstate commerce” was a residual clause limited by the references to “railroad
54
employees” and “seamen” in the same sentence. The Court effectively limited the scope of the exemption to “contracts of employ55
ment of transportation workers.”
The Supreme Court did not directly address the scope of the
56
exemption again until New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira in 2019. There, a
truck driver entered into an independent contractor relationship
57
with New Prime, an interstate trucking company. The driver
brought a wage suit against New Prime, and the company argued
58
that the dispute should be resolved through arbitration. The
driver contended that he was ineligible for arbitration, relying on
59
the FAA’s section 1 exemption. New Prime contested this point,
asserting that the exemption only applied to “contracts of em-

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (holding that the FAA preempts state laws
hostile to arbitration).
49. 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995). See Nicolas Enrique O’Connor, Note, The “Insurmountable
Textual Obstacle”: A Narrow Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
855 (2019), for a critique of the decision in Allied-Bruce arguing that the “involving commerce” interpretation adopted by the Court was too broad.
50. See Brief for Respondent at 18–20, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001) (No. 99-1379), 2000 WL 1369473, at *19–20.
51. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 110–11 (detailing the disagreement in the lower courts).
52. Id. at 119.
53. Id. at 115–16.
54. Id. at 114–15.
55. Id. at 119.
56. 139 S. Ct. 532, 538, 543–44 (2019).
57. Id. at 536.
58. Id. at 536–37.
59. Id.
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ployment,” and the truck driver, an independent contractor,
60
should be made to arbitrate his claims.
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, first held that, as a procedural point, courts should decide whether the section 1 exemp61
tion applies, rather than sending that question to the arbitrator.
Next, the Court concluded that the statutory term “contracts of
62
employment” included all agreements to perform work. Justice
Gorsuch explained that “words generally should be ‘interpreted as
taking their ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the
63
statute.’” He concluded that when Congress adopted the FAA in
1925, the term “contract of employment” meant “nothing more
than an agreement to perform work” and therefore included
“agreements that require independent contractors to perform
64
work.” Thus, by broadening the reach of the section 1 exemption,
the New Prime decision countered the Court’s expansion of the
scope of the FAA under Congress’s commerce powers.
Congress enacted the FAA to remedy the judiciary’s hostility to65
wards arbitration agreements. Thus, the original purpose of the
FAA was mainly procedural—to make federal courts hold parties to
66
their agreements to arbitrate future disputes. Because of this limited purpose, the drafters of the FAA were cognizant of the law’s
potential effects on employment arrangements and inserted language to deal with this concern. Despite this history, the Supreme
Court expanded the FAA’s reach and correspondingly narrowed
the exemption, reasoning that Congress enacted the FAA using its
67
commerce power. The Court’s decision in New Prime, however,
has slowed the expansion of the law—at least regarding the interpretation of the section 1 exemption—and provides workers, such
as rideshare drivers, an opportunity to potentially avoid arbitration.

60. Id.
61. Id. at 537.
62. Id. at 543–44.
63. Id. at 539 (quoting Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018)).
64. Id.
65. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118–19 (2001) (citing Allied-Bruce
Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S 265, 272–73 (1995)).
66. See MACNEIL, supra note 18, at 148.
67. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (reasoning that the FAA is based in Congress’ commerce power); Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119
(narrowing the scope of the exemption to only include transportation workers).
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II. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE
SECTION 1 EXEMPTION
New Prime may have profound effects on rideshare drivers’ ability
to avoid arbitration. A worker must meet two statutory conditions
to qualify under the FAA exemption: (1) he must have a “contract
of employment” and (2) he must be a seaman, railroad employee,
or “any other class of worker[] engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.” 68 Rideshare drivers, as independent contractors, now
satisfy the first prong of this test since contracts of employment are
69
not limited to employer-employee relationships. Moreover, the
Supreme Court’s conclusion that courts, rather than arbitrators,
should determine whether the exemption applies effectively leaves
70
the remaining statutory interpretation question to lower courts.
Thus, after New Prime, more and more courts will be asked to decide whether rideshare drivers qualify as “any other class of workers
71
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”
Section II.A traces the development of the analytical framework
employed by lower courts to define the exemption’s boundaries.
This framework originated in a line of decisions before Circuit City
and narrowly construes the exemption’s language to include only
those who move goods across state lines. Section II.B explains how
this narrow application may prohibit rideshare drivers from qualifying under the exemption.
A. Development of the Section 1 Exemption Framework
The framework governing the applicability of the section 1 exemption evolved in three stages of jurisprudence. First, before Circuit City, many courts limited the section 1 exemption to transpor-

68. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
69. See New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 543–44; Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 217 (3d
Cir. 2019) (explaining that New Prime eliminated the “contract of employment” argument
made by Uber in the suit under consideration by the court); Michele W. Berger, Supreme
Court Decision a Boon for Truck Drivers and, Potentially, the Gig Economy, PENN TODAY (Feb. 4,
2019), https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/supreme-court-decision-boon-truck-drivers-andpotentially-gig-economy [https://perma.cc/N2ZP-LPTV].
70. Previously, some courts concluded that arbitration clauses in some employment
contracts utilized by ridesharing companies left the determination of the exemption’s applicability to the arbitrator. E.g., Richemond v. Uber Techs., Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 1312,
1317–18 (S.D. Fla. 2017); Sienkaniec v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 17-CV-4489 (PJS/FLN), 2017
WL 7791193, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2017).
71. See Singh, 939 F.3d at 219–26 (considering whether an Uber driver is exempted
from the FAA); Rick Bales, “New Prime” and the Gig Economy, ARB. INFO, https:
//mulaw.missouri.edu/arbitrationinfo/new-prime-gig-economy (last visited Oct. 14, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/Y2S4-ACK3].
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tation workers and defined transportation workers as those who
moved goods in interstate commerce. Next, in Circuit City, the Supreme Court sided with the majority of lower courts and limited
the exemption to transportation workers but did not explicitly define that term. Finally, in the aftermath of Circuit City, courts continued to apply roughly the same pre-Circuit City framework. This
has led to arbitrary and accidental distinctions between different
classes of workers. The following discussion traces these three stages of evolution.
1. Pre-Circuit City Interpretation of the Section 1 Exemption
Before the decision in Circuit City, the main question lower
courts faced was whether the exemption applied to all employment
contracts. Most of the pre-Circuit City cases involved plaintiffs who
72
did not work in the transportation industry at all. In deciding
these cases, most courts of appeals held that the exemption did not
reach all employment contracts and limited its applicability to only
transportation workers. These courts defined transportation workers with explicit reference to their role in the movement of goods
73
in interstate commerce. For example, in Asplundh Tree Expert Co.
v. Bates, the Sixth Circuit held that the exemption did not apply to
a corporate executive for a consulting company. 74 The court reasoned that the exemption only applied to workers “actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce in the
75
same way that seamen and railroad workers are.” The court concluded that the executive had to arbitrate the dispute with his em76
ployer because he did not qualify under this definition.
The Third Circuit also limited the exemption to transportation
workers, but did not explicitly define transportation workers with

72. Singh, 939 F.3d at 224 (collecting cases prior to Circuit City and explaining that, in
those cases, the courts “were confronted with the same question: whether the residual clause
of § 1 covered the contracts of employment of those who were not in the transportation industry at all”).
73. E.g., Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1995); see also
Paladino v. Avnet Comput. Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 1998); O’Neil v.
Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109
F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Burns Int’l. Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470–72 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK Commc’ns, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996); Erving v. Va.
Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d
783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971).
74. 71 F.3d at 602.
75. Id. at 600–01.
76. Id. at 602.
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77

reference to the movement of goods in interstate commerce. In
Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electric Radio & Machine Workers of
America, the court applied the ejusdem generis canon in interpreting
section 1 and concluded that the exemption included “only
those . . . classes of workers who are actually engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely relat78
ed thereto as to be in practical effect part of it.” The court explained that the manufacturing employees were not exempted
because they were “not acting directly in the channels of interstate
79
commerce itself.” Notably, the court distinguished prior Third
Circuit cases holding that commercial bus drivers were exempt
80
from the FAA. The court explained that “the bus line employees
in those cases [were] directly engaged in the channels of interstate
81
transportation just as are railroad workers.”
Finally, in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., the Ninth Circuit held that
all employment contracts were exempted under section 1, creating
82
a circuit split. The court explained that Congress’s commerce
power when the FAA was enacted in 1925 only reached employees
83
who transported goods or people in interstate commerce. By exempting transportation workers, the FAA was effectively exempting
all employment contracts that could possibly be covered under the
84
Act. Therefore, under the expanded contemporary understand77. Tenney Eng’g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers Local 437, 207 F.2d 450,
453 (3d Cir. 1953).
78. Id. at 452. Ejusdem generis is “[a] canon of construction holding that when a general
word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to
include only items of the same class as those listed.” Ejusdem generis, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The Third Circuit’s application of the ejusdem generis canon to
the exemption language provided the framework for the Supreme Court’s analysis in Circuit
City almost fifty years later. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001);
Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 593 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that the decision in Tenney “presag[ed]” the decision in Circuit City).
79. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 453 (emphasis added); see also McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143
F.3d 573, 576 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the section 1 exemption includes only “employees actually engaged in the channels of foreign or interstate commerce”).
80. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 453.
81. Id. (citing Amalgamated Ass’n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps. v. Pa.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951); Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass’n of Street, Elec., Ry., & Motor Coach Emps., 193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952)). The
Circuit City Court cited Tenney along with other lower court decisions holding that the exemption did not apply to all employment contracts. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 111. But
grouping Tenney with these other cases ignores the fact that the Tenney definition of “transportation workers” also embraced those workers who move passengers. While that distinction may not have been consequential when the main question faced by lower courts was
whether all employment contracts were exempted from the FAA, it is especially crucial now
that the Supreme Court has limited the reach of the exemption to transportation workers.
See infra Section II.A.3.
82. 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), abrogated by Circuit City, 532 U.S.
at 105.
83. Id. at 1087.
84. Id. at 1087, 1092.
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ing of Congress’s commerce power, the section 1 exemption had
85
similarly broadened to include all employment contracts. The
court also determined that the legislative history of the FAA
“demonstrate[d] that the Act’s purpose was solely to bind mer86
chants who were involved in commercial dealings.” Finally, the
court reasoned that the FAA’s requirement that a valid arbitration
agreement “arise out of” a “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” illustrated that Congress did not intend for the
87
Act to apply to employment contracts at all. The court noted that,
when the FAA was passed, a “transaction” was “an act of buying and
selling” and, therefore, the term did not encompass employment
88
relationships.
Thus, before Circuit City, lower courts mostly addressed whether
employment contracts, as a category, fell within the scope of the
FAA. The courts split on the question, with the majority holding
that only employment contracts of transportation workers were exempted from the FAA. Of those courts exempting only transportation workers, most defined the term as those who move goods in
interstate commerce. In the minority, the Ninth Circuit held that
all employment contracts were exempt from the FAA.
2. Circuit City Decision
The Supreme Court resolved the split between the courts of appeals in Circuit City. In that case, a sales counselor at Circuit City
89
sued the company in federal district court in California. Circuit
City sought and was granted a motion to compel arbitration based

85. Id. at 1086–88. Other courts and scholars interpreting the exemption adopted similar reasoning. For example, in Arce v. Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., the Northern District of
Mississippi stated:
[I]nterstate commerce at the time the FAA was enacted was generally understood
to be limited to maritime and railroad transactions. Thus, when Congress excluded employment contracts of maritime and railroad workers, it resulted in voiding
the power to enforce arbitration clauses of most employment contracts. With the
addition of the catch-all phrase “or any other class of worker engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce,” all employment contracts would have been excluded
from the arbitration enforcement power of the FAA.
883 F. Supp. 117, 123 (N.D. Miss. 1995). See also Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 U. MO. K.C. L. REV. 449, 468 (1996); Archibald Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARV. L. REV. 591, 598 (1954).
86. Craft, 177 F.3d at 1089.
87. Id. at 1085, 1092.
88. Id. at 1085; see also id. at 1089 (concluding that the narrow interpretation of the
word “transaction” is supported by the legislative history of the FAA).
89. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109–11 (2001).
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90

on a provision in their employment application. While the plaintiff’s appeal of the district court decision was pending, the Ninth
Circuit decided Craft, holding that all employment contracts were
91
exempt from the FAA. Therefore, in Circuit City, the Ninth Circuit
92
simply applied Craft and reversed the lower court decision. Circuit City petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, highlighting
the fact that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the exemption
split from all other courts of appeals to consider the issue.93
The Supreme Court held that section 1 exempted only transportation workers, rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation. Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, explained that:
Construing the residual phrase [“any other class of workers
engaged in . . . commerce”] to exclude all employment
contracts fails to give independent effect to the statute’s
enumeration of the specific categories of workers which
precedes it; there would be no need for Congress to use the
phrases “seamen” and “railroad employees” if those same
classes of workers were subsumed within the meaning of
94
the “engaged in . . . commerce” residual clause.
95

The Court then applied the ejusdem generis and surplusage canons
to conclude that the application of the residual clause in section 1
should be limited to workers who are similar to railroad employees
and seamen. 96 Thus, the Court held that section 1 exempts only the
contracts of transportation workers rather than all employment
97
contracts.
In limiting the exemption’s reach to transportation workers, the
Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s argument that Congress intended the exemption’s reach to be coextensive with its commerce
power. For the Court, the plain meaning of section 1’s “engaged in
commerce” foreclosed this reading because that phrase was nar-

90. Id. at 110.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 110–11.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 114.
95. The surplusage canon, or the presumption against surplusage, holds that “every
word and every provision in a legal instrument is to be given effect.” Surplusage canon,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
96. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115 (explaining that the residual clause “should be read to
give effect to the terms ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees,’ and should itself be controlled
and defined by reference to the[se] enumerated categories”).
97. Id. at 119.
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rower than the section 2’s “involving commerce.” Whereas “involving commerce” signaled Congressional intent to regulate to
the full extent allowed by the Commerce Clause, “engaged in
commerce” was not meant to reach the outer limits of Congress’s
99
commerce power.
Thus, the decision in Circuit City clarified two pieces of section 1
exemption jurisprudence. First, the Court held that the exemption
only reached the contracts of employment of transportation workers rather than all employment contracts. Second, the Court explained that the exemption only covered those “engaged in commerce”—a narrower category than those involved in commerce.
3. Aftermath of the Circuit City Decision
The Circuit City decision indicated that only transportation
workers who are engaged in interstate commerce qualify for the
exemption. The contested cases are now those in which courts are
asked to define the scope of this requirement. Unfortunately, “lit100
tle consensus has been realized” in Circuit City’s aftermath. Some
patterns have emerged, however, as courts use fact-based distinctions to decide the cases before them. Courts have distinguished
between: (1) workers who are involved in the transportation industry and those who are not, (2) workers who move goods and those
who move passengers, and (3) workers who travel across state lines
101
and those who make purely intrastate trips.
First, courts have held that workers must be employed in the
102
transportation industry to qualify under the exemption. For ex98. Id. at 118. The Court had endorsed an expansive interpretation of “involving commerce” in Allied-Bruce. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995); see
also supra Section I.B.
99. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422
U.S. 271, 283 (1975)).
100. Muller v. Roy Miller Freight Lines, LLC, 246 Cal. Rptr. 3d 748, 753 (Ct. App. 2019)
(internal quotation omitted).
101. To be sure, courts do not employ these distinctions as a strict test nor do all courts
make these distinctions. Rather, these distinctions are based on an analysis of messy caselaw
encompassing many different fact patterns across many different courts. Moreover, the following discussion does not capture all of the distinguishing characteristics that have been
used by lower courts in the aftermath of Circuit City. Instead, this Note focuses on those
characteristics that may prove relevant as lower courts are increasingly tasked with determining whether rideshare drivers are exempt from the FAA. See infra Section II.B (explaining
that some of these distinguishing factors may prove to be obstacles for rideshare drivers’
ability to take advantage of the exemption). For a broader discussion of relevant factors, see
Lenz v. Yellow Transportation, Inc., 431 F.3d 348, 352 (8th Cir. 2005), which synthesized the
universe of section 1 exemption cases and determined that there are eight factors that are
relevant for determining whether a worker is exempted.
102. Adkins v. Labor Ready, 303 F.3d 496, 505–06 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that a temporary employee of a company that provides manual day laborers was not exempted from
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ample, in Hill v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that
an account manager for a company that rented furniture and appliances to customers was not exempt from the FAA even though
103
he delivered goods across state lines as part of his employment.
The court explained that Circuit City emphasized a “class of workers
in the transportation industry, rather than . . . workers who inci104
dentally transported goods interstate as part of their job.” The
court concluded that merely interstate transportation was insuffi105
cient on its own for qualification under the exemption. The
worker also must “be employed in the transportation industry” for
106
the section 1 exemption to apply.
Second, courts have sometimes defined transportation workers
as only those workers who move goods, and therefore declined to
107
exempt passenger-centric workers. For example, in rejecting a
section 1 exemption claim by drivers for a car service company, the
Southern District of New York explained that “transporting passengers interstate as part of a car service is too far removed from
the type of work engaged in by seamen and railroad workers—that
is, being a member of an industry that primarily involves the actu108
al, physical movement of goods through interstate commerce.”
That same court found that the “involvement of physical goods [is]
an indispensable element” for qualification as a transportation
109
worker. Furthermore, one state court concluded that a commercial airline pilot was not exempt from the FAA, even after acknowledging that he moved cargo as part of his job, because his participation in the movement of goods was incidental to his
110
transportation of passengers.
By exempting only those who move goods, these courts have
read Circuit City as a confirmation of the previous, judicially-

the FAA since neither “a majority or . . . plurality of [the worker’s] daily assignments were in
transportation-related industries”); Tran v. Texan Lincoln Mercury, Inc., No. H-07-1815,
2007 WL 2471616, at *1–2, *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2007) (holding that an employee of a car
dealership was not a transportation worker because he worked in the automobile industry,
not the transportation industry).
103. 398 F.3d 1286, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2005).
104. Id. at 1289 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 1290.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Gadson v. SuperShuttle Int’l, No. 10-cv-01057-AW, 2011 WL 1231311 (D.
Md. Mar. 30, 2011), vacated on other grounds by Murithi v. Shuttle Express, Inc., 712 F.3d 173
(4th Cir. 2013); Kowalewski v. Samandarov, 590 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
108. Kowalewski, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 484.
109. Id.
110. JetBlue Airways Corp. v. Stephenson, No. 650691/2010, 2010 WL 6781684, at *3
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 22, 2010). But see Lepera v. ITT Corp., No. 97-1461, 1997 WL 535165, at
*7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 1997) (holding that an airline pilot who transported passengers interstate is exempt from the FAA).
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111
imposed definition of transportation workers. Circuit City, however, did not affirmatively endorse a definition of transportation
workers that focuses on the movement of goods. Because the plaintiff was a sales counselor with no connection to the transportation
industry, the Court did not need to define the term. At one point
in the opinion, the Court noted that “[m]ost courts of appeals
conclude the exclusion provision is limited to transportation workers, defined, for instance, as those workers ‘actually engaged in the
112
movement of goods in interstate commerce.’” The Court’s use of
“for instance” indicates that it did not mean to clarify the entire
113
field of transportation workers but merely provide an example.
Lower courts have read Circuit City as confirmation that the term
“transportation worker” includes only those who move goods, even
though the decision did not formally endorse a definition of the
term.
Reading the goods-centric definition of transportation workers
into Circuit City without the Supreme Court’s endorsement extends
the definition beyond its useful application. The goods-centric definition was meant to demarcate a boundary between workers who
had no connection to the transportation industry and those who
114
did. It was not intended to answer the question courts now face:
the strength of the connection to interstate commerce necessary
115
for classification as a transportation worker. Therefore, by including only those who move goods without considering these
changed circumstances, courts are using a tool that was built for a
different purpose.
Third, courts have held that only workers who actually move
across state lines are engaged in commerce and exempt from the

111. See, e.g., Brown v. Nabors Offshore Corp., 339 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining that that the Court’s analysis in Circuit City was consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s
prior decision limiting the transportation worker exemption to include only those who
move goods in interstate commerce); Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280,
1284, 1284 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that in Circuit City, the Court “affirmed the validity” of the circuit’s prior opinion holding that the exemption only applies to transportation workers engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce). For a discussion
of lower court decisions prior to Circuit City, see supra Section II.A.1.
112. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001) (emphasis added)
(quoting Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
113. See Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 37, 44 (D. Mass. 2020) (reasoning that
the Supreme Court’s use of “for instance” in Circuit City indicated that the Court did not
intend to define the term “transportation workers”).
114. Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 224 (3d Cir. 2019).
115. See Cunningham, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 43 (“Circuit City and each of the earlier appellate
decisions . . . addressed whether the exemption excluded contracts of non-transportation
workers and did not address the nuances between different types of transportation workers.”).
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116
FAA. For example, in Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., the Seventh Circuit considered whether couriers for a food-delivery service were “engaged in interstate commerce.” 117 There, the plaintiffworkers delivered food to customers from local restaurants when
118
requested through a smartphone application. They argued that
they were transportation workers because they facilitated the
transportation of food that may have originated out of state or
119
been previously transported in interstate commerce. The court
rejected this “stream of commerce” argument and held that the
plaintiffs did not qualify for the exemption because they did not
120
move goods across state lines. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ argument was foreclosed by Circuit City’s instruction to nar121
rowly construe the exemption.
Other courts, including the First Circuit and the Ninth Circuit,
have not required that workers move across state lines when the
workers in question are part of a broader distribution system that
122
transports goods in interstate commerce. Often these cases involve last-mile delivery truck drivers—truckers who deliver goods
that have previously moved across state lines, but do not them123
selves move across state lines during the course of their work. On
their face, last-mile delivery truck drivers are identical to food service couriers since both make purely local deliveries. Yet, courts
have been more receptive to the stream of commerce conception
of interstate commerce in the last-mile delivery truck driver cas-

116. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 50 v. Kienstra Precast, LLC, 702 F.3d 954,
957–58 (7th Cir. 2012). In Kienstra Precast, a union representing concrete mixer drivers alleged that Kienstra violated their collective bargaining agreement and the company tried to
compel arbitration. Id. at 955. Even though some of the drivers had made interstate deliveries, the company argued that their employees did not qualify for the exemption because the
interstate trips were an insubstantial part of their business. Id. at 958. The court rejected this
argument and held that even a minimal proportion of interstate trips was sufficient for exemption under the FAA. Id.
117. 970 F.3d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 2020).
118. Id. at 799.
119. Id. at 802–03.
120. Id. at 803–04; see also Levin v. Caviar, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1152 (N.D. Cal.
2015); Magana v. DoorDash, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 891, 899–900 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (holding
that a driver for DoorDash, a similar food-delivery service, was not exempt from the FAA
because he did not “allege that he either moved or supervised the movement of goods
across state lines”); Lee v. Postmates Inc., No. 18-cv-03421-JCS, 2018 WL 6605659, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2018) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that they were transportation workers because they did not “cite any case holding that making only local deliveries, for a company that does not hold itself out as transporting goods between states, constitutes engaging
in interstate commerce within the meaning of the statute”).
121. Wallace, 970 F.3d at 800–03.
122. See, e.g., Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 26 (1st Cir. 2020); Rittmann v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 915 (9th Cir. 2020); Diaz v. Mich. Logistics, 167 F. Supp.
3d 375, 380 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); Nieto v. Fresno Beverage Co., 245 Cal. Rptr. 3d 69, 76–77
(Ct. App. 2019).
123. See Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 26; Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 907.
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124

es. One district court distinguished the last-mile delivery truck
driver cases from the food service courier cases by explaining that
the interstate journey of the food delivered by the courier ends
when the ingredients are delivered to the restaurant before the
125
courier’s involvement. The ingredients that moved interstate become a new, purely local product when they are turned into a fin126
ished meal. Thus, the finished product delivered by the food ser127
vice courier is not a good in interstate commerce. On the other
hand, the packages delivered by last-mile delivery truck drivers are
continually in interstate commerce until the worker delivers the
128
goods to the consumer.
The last-mile delivery truck driver cases also indicate that the
three distinctions are interrelated. That is, courts are more likely to
require the movement of goods across state lines where the worker
129
is not clearly involved in the transportation industry. Indeed, one
court holding that last-mile delivery drivers are exempt from the
FAA began its discussion by explaining that truck drivers were the
130
quintessential example of a transportation worker. Perhaps,
where the trucking industry is involved, courts are less likely to re131
quire that the worker physically move goods across state lines.
Even though the Circuit City Court did not endorse a specific
definition of transportation workers, lower courts have drawn dis-

124. E.g., Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 26 (concluding that “last-mile delivery workers who haul
goods on the final legs of interstate journeys are transportation workers”); Rittmann, 971
F.3d at 915 (holding that last-mile delivery drivers are exempt from the FAA).
125. Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 3d 335, 341 (D. Mass. 2019), aff’d, 966
F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2020).
126. Id.; see also Rittman v. Amazon.com, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1201–02 (W.D.
Wash. 2019), aff’d, 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020).
127. Waithaka, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 341.
128. Id. at 341–42.
129. See Veliz v. Cintas Corp., No. C 03-1180 SBA, 2004 WL 2452851, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 5, 2004) (observing that “the more related to the transportation industry an enterprise
is, the less necessary it becomes for the employee to be directly transporting goods”).
130. See Waithaka, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 340.
131. Indeed, some courts have held that those who merely supervised the movement of
goods in interstate commerce were exempt from the FAA. But these cases are also limited to
the trucking industry. See Zamora v. Swift Transp. Co., No. EP-07-CA-00400-KC, 2008 WL
2369769, at *7 (W.D. Tex. June 3, 2008) (finding that a terminal manager for an interstate
trucking company whose job duties included monitoring the productivity of the fleet, monitoring revenue, improving driver retention, managing costs, reducing expenses, and monitoring full utilization of equipment was exempted from the FAA). But see Fuentes v. Rush
Truck Ctrs. of Cal., Inc., No. EDCV 18-10446 (SPx), 2019 WL 3240100, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 11, 2019) (acknowledging that a worker need not be personally involved in the interstate movement of goods to qualify under the exemption, but holding that a mechanic must
arbitrate his disputes because he is not a transportation worker); Bell v. Ryan Transp. Serv.,
Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1254–56 (D. Kan. 2016) (holding that a carrier sales representative employed by a third-party logistics company whose duties included locating trucking
companies for transport and negotiating the price for trucking goods was not exempt from
the FAA).
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tinctions that generally narrow the categories of workers that qualify for the section 1 exemption. Courts have required that workers
be employed in the transportation industry, move goods, and physically move across state lines.
B. Application of the Post-Circuit City Framework to
Rideshare Drivers
To date, there have not been many cases involving rideshare
drivers. But from existing case law, it is clear that the post-Circuit
City distinctions create multiple obstacles for rideshare drivers. The
first obstacle is the requirement that the worker move goods to
qualify as a transportation worker. Federal district courts in New
132
Jersey, Ohio, Florida, California, and the District of Columbia
have all held that rideshare drivers are not exempt from the FAA
because they move primarily passengers in interstate commerce rather than goods. However, the Third Circuit recently held that the
“FAA . . . operate[s] to exclude from FAA coverage the contracts of
employment of all classes of transportation workers, so long as they
are engaged in interstate commerce,” overturning the District of
133
New Jersey. Additionally, the District of Minnesota recently held
that rideshare drivers may qualify for the exemption even though
134
they do not primarily move goods in interstate commerce. Thus,
although the application of the “goods-centric” framework to passenger-oriented workers is an ominous sign for rideshare drivers,
the few courts to recently address the issue are split as to whether
that framework should be applied in this new context.
Second, the requirement that a worker “engage” in interstate
commerce by moving across state lines is a potential obstacle for
rideshare drivers. For example, the District Court of Minnesota
held that passenger-centric rideshare drivers could be exempted
from the FAA, but would not exempt the individual plaintiff be135
cause he had never driven a passenger across state lines. Instead,
the court asked for additional briefing to determine whether the

132. Grice v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 18-2995 (GJSx), 2020 WL 497487, at *6 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 7, 2020); Scaccia v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:18-cv-00418, 2019 WL 2476811, at *5
(S.D. Ohio June 13, 2019); Gray v. Uber, Inc., No. 8:18-cv-3093-T-30SPF, 2019 WL 1785094,
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2019); Tyler v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 19-3492, 2020 WL 5569948, at *6
(D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2020); Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 656, 671 (D.N.J. 2017),
vacated by Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2019).
133. Singh, 939 F.3d at 226.
134. Sienkaniec v. Uber Techs., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 3d 870, 871–72 (D. Minn. 2019).
135. Id. at 872.
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plaintiff was part of a class of workers who move across state lines.
This request revealed that the court’s definition of transportation
workers was still focused on the need to move across state lines. Relatedly, the Third Circuit remanded the question of whether the
137
Uber driver-plaintiff was “engaged” in interstate commerce. Finally, two separate district judges in the Northern District of California recently held that rideshare drivers are not part of a class of
138
workers engaged in interstate commerce. Therefore, the few
courts to address this issue have largely been unwilling to find that
rideshare drivers are engaged in interstate commerce as a class,
and some courts have required individual rideshare drivers to
139
move across state lines to qualify for the section 1 exemption.
Given the dearth of cases involving rideshare drivers, courts have
a unique opportunity to rethink the post-Circuit City conception of
the transportation worker exemption. New Prime’s holding that independent contractors qualify under the exemption removes one
legal barrier for rideshare drivers. Yet, given the current doctrinal
focus on the movement of goods across state lines, rideshare drivers still may not be exempt from the FAA. The doctrine applied to
rideshare drivers is evolving, however, giving courts the opportunity to adapt the section 1 exemption analysis to match technological
development.
The lower courts have largely declined to change the analytical
framework in the aftermath of Circuit City. Not doing so, however,
will create random demarcations between classes of workers. For
example, the focus on goods means that a rideshare driver who
regularly makes trips on interstate highways to drive passengers to
airports is not a transportation worker. Meanwhile, for some
courts, a last-mile delivery truck driver who makes purely local de140
liveries is a transportation worker. These arbitrary and accidental
boundaries will become unworkable as more rideshare drivers seek
exemption from the FAA. Courts must recognize that the current

136. See id. at 872–73. The court specified that the parties’ briefing should focus on Uber’s national operations and the number of trips that Uber drivers, as a whole, make across
state lines. Id.
137. Singh, 939 F.3d at 226–27.
138. Rogers v. Lyft, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 904, 914–17 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (holding that,
although section 1 is not limited to those workers who move goods in interstate commerce,
Lyft drivers, as a class, are not engaged in interstate commerce and therefore do not qualify
for the exemption); Capriole v. Uber Techs., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 3d 919, 929–32 (N.D. Cal.
2020) (finding that Uber drivers are not engaged in interstate commerce because they rarely make interstate trips).
139. But see Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 37, 46–47 (D. Mass. 2020) (holding that Lyft drivers, as a class, are engaged in commerce because “some of [their] passengers are in continuity of motion in interstate travel”).
140. See supra Section II.A.3.
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framework is unsuitable for the questions posed by rideshare drivers and take a broader approach to the section 1 exemption.
III. DETERMINING THE HISTORIC ORDINARY MEANING OF THE
SECTION 1 EXEMPTION
The two legal obstacles rideshare drivers still face in seeking exemption under the FAA—the “goods” requirement and the “interstate travel” requirement—can both be traced to the text of section
1. The Supreme Court in Circuit City reasoned that the statutory
references to “seamen” and “railroad employees” limited the reach
141
of the exemption. Lower courts have concluded that, when the
FAA was passed in 1925, seamen and railroad employees moved
only goods and therefore contemporary workers must also move
142
goods to qualify for the exemption. The Court in Circuit City explained that the term “engaged in . . . commerce” in the residual
clause should be narrowly construed. 143 Lower courts have determined that this language encompasses only workers who move
144
across state lines. In New Prime, Justice Gorsuch stressed that the
FAA “should be interpreted as taking [its] ordinary meaning . . .
[which is the] meaning at the time Congress enacted the stat145
ute.” These narrow interpretations of the FAA are only correct if
they are supported by the historical understanding of the statutory
terms.
This Part undertakes a historical and textual analysis of the statute and argues that it does not support the current interpretation
of the exemption. Rather, the legislative history and the historic
ordinary understanding of the FAA’s terms demonstrate that the
exemption embraces passenger-oriented transportation workers
who are in the flow of commerce, even if they only move intrastate.
Section III.A briefly discusses legislative history, which indicates
that section 1 of the FAA should be construed more broadly. Section III.B analyzes the historic, ordinary meaning of the terms
“seamen” and “railroad workers” to show that neither term limits
the residual clause of the exemption to only those who move

141. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001).
142. E.g., Kowalewski v. Samandarov, 590 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding
that passenger transportation was “too far removed” from the type of work undertaken by
seamen and railroad workers when the FAA was passed). But see Singh, 939 F.3d at 222 (holding that passenger-centric transportation workers may qualify under the exemption).
143. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115.
144. See, e.g., supra note 116 and accompanying text.
145. New Prime v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (alterations in original) (quoting
Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018)).
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goods. Section III.C asserts that the original understanding of the
term “engaged in . . . interstate commerce” does not require that
the worker move across state lines. Section III.D concludes that the
inclusion of rideshare drivers in the exemption is a positive policy
outcome.
A. Clues from the FAA’s Legislative History
Although there is very little legislative history addressing the section 1 exemption itself, the majority of the statements made by the
FAA’s drafters indicate that the exemption should be construed
more broadly than it is currently interpreted. In particular, the legislative history strongly suggests that the FAA was only meant to
146
apply to contracts between merchants. W.H.H. Piatt, the chairman of the ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, explained that the FAA was “purely an act to give the
merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing
with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do
147
it.” He added that the FAA only implicated “contract[s] between
148
merchants one with another, buying and selling goods.” Other
witnesses described the bill solely with reference to disputes be149
tween businessmen. One witness explained that an identical state
bill was successful because “business men have adopted the prac150
tice of getting together and settling their business differences.”
Additionally, the New York arbitration law upon which the FAA was
151
based was designed to promote arbitration between merchants.

146. See Leslie, supra note 23, at 305 (“The most important fact about the testimony,
hearings, and reports leading up to congressional enactment of the FAA is that every witness, every Senator, and every Representative discussed one issue and one issue only: arbitration of contract disputes between merchants.”); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction:
How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99,
106 (2006) (“The hearings make clear that the focus of the Act was merchant-to-merchant
arbitrations.”).
147. 1923 Hearings at 9 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
148. Id. at 10.
149. See Leslie, supra note 23, at 306–07 (explaining that various witnesses provided examples which only pertained to disputes between businessmen and that the discussion of
the bill focused on the commercial world); Moses, supra note 146, at 106 (“All of the examples given by [one witness] as to cases he knew about or cases he had personally been involved with through the New York Chamber of Commerce were cases between merchants.”).
150. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the
J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 31 (1924) [hereinafter 1924 Hearings]
(statement of William J. Vance).
151. See Julius Henry Cohen, Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31
YALE L.J. 147, 150–52 (1921) (analyzing the benefits of the New York law that pre-dated the
FAA and explaining that “men of commercial expertise . . . know whether the contract is of
a kind under which disputes can be better disposed of by trade committees or by twelve inexpert strangers to the trade”); see also Leslie, supra note 23, at 305–06.
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Presumably because of this focus on arbitration between merchants, the bill’s main support came from a number of merchant
152
and trade associations.
The little legislative history that is specific to the section 1 exemption suggests that the drafters intended to exclude all labor
contracts from the FAA. As discussed in Part I, the FAA’s drafters
inserted the exemption as a response to criticism brought by the
153
International Seamen’s Union, among others. Relatedly, the
American Federation of Labor later explained to its members that
it lifted its objection to the bill because the text added to section 1
154
“exempted labor from the provisions of the law.” In the hearings,
Piatt explained that the bill was “not intended [to] be an act refer155
ring to labor disputes at all.”
Before the decision in Circuit City, the academic and judicial debate regarding the section 1 exemption concerned whether or not
156
all employment contracts were exempted from the FAA. In Circuit City, the Supreme Court held that the exemption applied only
157
to transportation worker contracts. The Court reasoned that, because the FAA was meant to overcome judicial hostility to arbitra158
tion, Congress intended the Act to apply broadly. For the Court,
a narrow construction of the exemption left very few arbitration
agreements outside the FAA’s scope, thereby vindicating Con159
gress’s intent. Post-Circuit City, courts have sometimes declined to
exempt rideshare drivers from the FAA, pointing to the Court’s
160
reasoning about the purpose of the statute.

152. See id. at 21–22 (listing the various groups supporting the bill).
153. See supra Section I.A.
154. Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual Convention of the American Federation of
Labor 52 (1925), cited in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 127 n.8 (2001)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Moses, supra note 146, at 147.
155. 1923 Hearings at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt); see also supra note 43 (explaining
that Charles Bernheimer, an ABA member and one of the leading proponents of the bill,
believed that the provision eliminated employment contracts from the scope of the Act).
156. Compare Finkin, supra note 6, at 298–99 (arguing that Congress intended to exempt
all employment contracts from the FAA), with William F. Kolakowski III, Note, The Federal
Arbitration Act and Individual Employment Contracts: A Better Means to an Equally Just End, 93
MICH. L. REV. 2171, 2175 (1995) (arguing that most employment contracts should not be
exempted from the FAA). Notably, Kolakowski did not argue that the legislative history of
the FAA supported a narrow interpretation of the exemption. Instead, he did not draw any
“firm conclusions . . . about congressional intent regarding the exception’s scope” and contended that the text of the Act favors a narrow reading. Kolakowski, supra, at 2175. Some
scholars still argue that the decision in Circuit City was inconsistent with the legislative history
of the FAA. See Leslie, supra note 23, at 305; Moses, supra note 146, at 146.
157. 532 U.S. at 118–19.
158. Id.; see also supra Section I.A (explaining that the FAA was enacted in response to
the judiciary’s unwillingness to enforce arbitration agreements in court).
159. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 118–19.
160. E.g., Grice v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 18-2995 (GJSx), 2020 WL 497487, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2020); see also supra Sections II.A.3, II.B (discussing the lower courts’ inter-
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The legislative history of the FAA suggests, however, that lower
courts have narrowed the exemption too far and ignored the drafters’ reservations regarding the inclusion of labor within the scope
of the Act. At the very least, the legislative history indicates that the
law was only meant to apply in specific circumstances (disputes between merchants) and certainly does not prohibit the courts from
applying the exemption more broadly. Courts should not shy away
from broadly construing the exemption within the confines of the
Circuit City decision, if the language of the statute allows such a
reading. The next two sections of this Note analyze the history and
text of the exemption and conclude that the language supports a
broader reading.
B. Ordinary Meaning of “Seamen” and “Railroad Employees”
In Circuit City, the Supreme Court held that the statute’s “explicit reference to ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees’” limits the reach
161
of the section 1 exemption. Thus, looking at the definition of
these terms is helpful in determining what “other class[es] of
162
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” look like.
The following discussion analyzes the statutory and judiciallyproscribed definitions of these terms, and concludes that both include workers who move passengers. Rideshare drivers are therefore squarely within the boundaries demarcated by these terms.
1. Definition of Seamen
The term “seamen” is not limited to only those who move goods.
Because the FAA does not define “seamen,” courts interpreting
section 1 typically look to judicial interpretations of “seamen” from
163
the Jones Act. The Jones Act provides a cause of action for seamen “injured in the course of employment” against their employ164
er. The Jones Act does not provide a definition for “seamen” either but the Supreme Court has interpreted the term broadly to
mean “a person . . . employed on board a vessel in furtherance of

pretation of the exemption after Circuit City as applied to rideshare drivers and in the context of other employment relationships).
161. 532 U.S. at 114.
162. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1.
163. E.g., Brown v. Nabors Offshore Corp., 339 F.3d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 2003); Buckley v.
Nabors Drilling USA Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 958, 964 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Veliz v. Cintas
Corp., No. C 03-1180 SBA, 2004 WL 2452851, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2004).
164. 46 U.S.C. § 30104.
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165

[the vessel’s] purpose.” Importantly, the Court has explained
that this was the definition of seamen under maritime law when
Congress passed the Jones Act in 1920—only five years before en166
acting the FAA. Some courts have applied this definition of seamen to the FAA, exempting workers who were employed on vessels
167
that did not move goods at all.
Additionally, the historical understanding of seamen clearly contemplated those who worked on passenger ships. For example, the
Shipping Commissioner’s Act of 1872 (SCA) defined seamen to
include “every person . . . who shall be employed or engaged to
168
serve in any capacity on board” a ship covered by the SCA. This
broad definition is consistent with late nineteenth and early twentieth century judicial interpretations of the term. Maritime cases
both before and around the time the FAA was passed held that
169
170
171
172
173
firemen, surgeons, cooks, musicians, and bartenders were
174
all seamen. None of these workers are involved in the movement
of goods. For some of these workers, such as bartenders and musicians, their presence is only necessary on passenger vessels. Indeed,
the test of whether one is a seaman has historically depended on
(1) whether the vessel is in navigation, (2) the permanency of the
person’s connection to the vessel, and (3) whether the services
175
rendered are maritime in nature. These characteristics make no
distinction between employment on a vessel that moves passengers
and a vessel that moves goods. Thus, at the time the FAA was
passed, the term “seamen” did not require that the worker participate in the movement of goods instead of passengers.

165. McDermott Int’l., Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 346 (1991).
166. See id. at 342.
167. E.g., Brown, 339 F.3d at 393 (holding that an employee on an offshore drilling rig
was a seaman and therefore exempt from the FAA).
168. See Veliz, 2004 WL 2452851, at *4 (quoting the Shipping Commissioners Act of
1872).
169. E.g., Wilson v. The Ohio, 30 F. Cas. 149, 150 (E.D. Pa. 1834) (No. 17,825) (holding
that a fireman on a ship carrying passengers and merchandise could sue in admiralty for his
wages).
170. E.g., Hoof v. Pac. Am. Fisheries, 284 F. 174, 176 (W.D. Wash. 1922).
171. E.g., Allen v. Hallet, 1 F. Cas. 472, 472–74 (S.D.N.Y. 1849) (No. 223).
172. E.g., The Sea Lark, 14 F.2d 201, 201–02 (W.D. Wash. 1926).
173. E.g., The J.S. Warden, 175 F. 314, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1910).
174. Notably, in New Prime, the Supreme Court recognized these early definitions of
seamen. There, defendant New Prime argued that when the FAA was passed in 1925, the
terms “seamen” and “railroad employees” included only employees, and not independent
contractors. New Prime v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 542 (2019). But Justice Gorsuch rejected
this argument, explaining that the terms swept broadly as a historical matter, and cited to
the various cases defining seamen to include basically any employee on board a vessel in
navigation. Id. at 543–44.
175. 1 MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN 6 (2d ed. 1962).
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2. Definition of Railroad Employees
The understanding of the term “railroad employees” at the time
the FAA was passed also included workers who transported both
176
goods and passengers. Although the FAA does not define the
term railroad employees, other acts provide definitions that in177
clude both passenger and freight railroad workers. For example,
in 1898, Congress defined railroad employees in the Erdman Act
as “all persons actually engaged in any capacity in train operation
178
or train service of any description.”
The Supreme Court’s historical discussion in Circuit City further
indicates that railroad employees who transported passengers were
exempt from the FAA. The Court speculated that railroad employees and seamen were exempted from the FAA because, at the time
of the Act’s passage, there were statutory dispute resolution
179
schemes already in place for those workers. The Court cited the
Transportation Act of 1920 and the Railway Labor Act of 1926 as
examples of pre-existing federal railroad employee dispute resolu180
tion regulations. At the time the FAA was passed, both of these
laws covered “carriers” and defined this term to include “sleeping
181
car compan[ies].” Furthermore, the Railway Labor Act’s jurisdiction over “carriers” referenced railroads subject to the Interstate
182
The ICA exercised jurisdiction over
Commerce Act (ICA).
“common carriers engaged in . . . the transportation of passengers
183
or property.”
In short, the Transportation Act and the Railway Labor Act—the
laws that created the dispute resolution mechanisms for railroad
employees—covered workers who moved both passengers and
184
goods. Extending the Court’s logic that these dispute resolution
mechanisms and the FAA were mutually exclusive, these passenger176. See Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2019) (arguing that the
historical understanding of the term railroad employee supports the conclusion that the
definition of the term “transportation worker” extends to “workers who transport goods as
well as those who transport passengers”).
177. See, e.g., New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 543 (discussing the Railroad Labor Board’s broad
construction of the term “employee” in the Transportation Act of 1920 and concluding that
the Erdman Act “evince[s] an equally broad understanding of ‘railroad employees’”).
178. Act of June 1, 1898, § 370, 30 Stat. 424.
179. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001) (“It is reasonable to assume that Congress excluded ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees’ from the FAA for the simple reason that it did not wish to unsettle established or developing statutory dispute resolution scheme covering specific workers.”)
180. See id.
181. Transportation Act of 1920, § 209, 41 Stat. 464; Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 1, 44
Stat. 577.
182. Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 1, 44 Stat. 577.
183. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, § 104, 24 Stat. 379.
184. See Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 221–22 (3d Cir. 2019).
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centric employees must have been exempt from the FAA at the
time the Act was passed.
The prevalence of passenger railroad transportation when the
FAA was passed in 1925 further illustrates that Congress intended
to exempt railroad employees who moved passengers. Indeed, in
1915, railroads carried over one million passengers with 55,000
185
passenger cars. Over the course of the 1920s, the use of railroads
186
declined with the increasing growth of automobile travel. In
187
1929, however, there were still 20,000 passenger trains. If the
FAA drafters wanted to make a distinction between the two sets of
workers, they would have made this clear. But they made no such
indication. Instead, the definition of railroad employee at the time
included both freight and passenger railroad workers.
Finally, more recent judicial interpretations of “railroad employees” include workers who move passengers. In 1936, Congress
amended the Railway Labor Act to include “every common carrier
188
by air engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.” In response,
multiple courts have interpreted the provision to apply to passen189
ger airlines.
C. Historic Understanding of “Engaged in . . . Interstate Commerce”
In Circuit City, the Supreme Court held that the phrase “engaged
in . . . interstate commerce” in section 1’s residual clause did not
make the reach of the exemption coextensive with the reach of
Congress’s commerce power. 190 Instead, the Court explained that
workers “engaging” in commerce constitute a narrower category
191
than those “affecting” or “involving” commerce. Lower courts

185. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 235, 275
(2003).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 45 U.S.C. § 181; see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001).
189. See, e.g., Melanson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 931 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1991).
190. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 115.
191. Id. Prior to Circuit City, there was some academic debate as to whether Congress
intended any distinction between these statutory terms. Compare Finkin, supra note 6, at 294
n.55 (arguing that the drafters of the FAA could not have intended this distinction where
the early Supreme Court cases did not recognize the distinction between “engaging in
commerce” and “involving” or “affecting” commerce), with Kolakowski, supra note 156, at
2177–79 (arguing that the early Supreme Court cases indicated that the term “engaged” in
commerce was narrower than the term “affecting” commerce). One scholar has recently
reinvigorated this debate by arguing that Congress intended section 2’s “involving
commerce” language to be narrower than the meaning eventually given to it by the
Supreme Court. See O’Connor, supra note 49, at 857. For O’Connor, this narrower
interpretation of “involving commerce” means that Circuit City “never needed to address
whether the section 1 exemption applies to all contracts of employment because the only
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have largely read Circuit City to indicate that the worker must move
192
across state lines in order to qualify under the exemption. But
this interpretation is unnecessary and inconsistent with the historical interpretation of the phrase “engaged in . . . commerce,” which
does not impose this requirement.
Historically, the term “engaged in . . . commerce” has embraced
193
the entire stream of commerce, including intrastate movement.
Courts have interpreted federal statutes passed around the same
time as the FAA that use the “engaged in commerce” language to
embrace a stream-of-commerce conception of interstate com194
merce. For example, the Clayton Act, passed in 1914, applies to
the “flow of interstate commerce—the practical, economic continuity in the generation of goods and services for interstate markets
195
and their transport and distribution to the consumer.” In Circuit
City, the Supreme Court approvingly cited the Clayton Act definition in arguing that “engaging” in commerce was narrower than
196
“affecting” commerce. If the Court intended to limit the exemption to only those workers who move across state lines, it would not
have cited a definition of “engaged in commerce” that explicitly
uses a flow of commerce understanding of the phrase. Moreover,
as far back as 1870, the Supreme Court has held that purely intra-

contracts of employment which could be covered by the FAA would be those of
transportation workers.” Id. This Note does not argue that any of the Supreme Court’s prior
arbitration jurisprudence was wrongly decided, so it takes the conclusion that “engaged
in . . . commerce” is narrower than “affecting . . . commerce” or “involving commerce” as
given.
192. See supra Section II.A.3.
193. See Brief of the Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of America as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Respondent at 5, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379)
[hereinafter Brief of Ass’n of Trial Lawyers] (explaining that “several dozen” federal laws
that use the term “engaged in commerce” and many others using the term “in commerce”
“have been construed to apply to the entire stream of commerce, from the production of
goods or services which pass through interstate channels until their distribution”). Recently,
both the First Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have canvassed many of the same historical statutes discussed in the subsequent pages of this Note, concluding that the exemption encompassed delivery drivers that were in the stream of commerce even though the drivers only
moved intrastate. See Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 18–26 (1st Cir. 2020);
Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 909–15 (9th Cir. 2020).
194. See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . .”), § 18 (“No person engaged in commerce . . . .”).
195. United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 283 (1975) (quoting Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974)). The Court has applied similar interpretations to the Federal Trade Commission Act (also passed in 1914) and the Lanham
Act (passed in 1946), among others. See Brief of Ass’n of Trial Lawyers, supra note 193, at
6–8.
196. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115–17. The Supreme Court also endorsed the flow of
commerce understanding of the exemption in Allied-Bruce. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995) (holding that the words “involving commerce” are broader than simply activities in the flow of commerce) (citing United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint.
Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 276 (1975)).
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state trips are in the flow of commerce as long as they are a com197
ponent part of an interstate movement.
Even early Supreme Court cases interpreting the Federal Employers Liability Act of 1908 (FELA), which is specific to the transportation industry, did not require that workers move across state
lines. That Act makes “every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce . . . liable in damages to any person suffering in198
jury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce.”
The Court held that the statute covered, for example, a repairman
199
on a bridge regularly used in interstate transportation and a yard
200
worker who inspected trains moving in interstate commerce. Because these workers were related to interstate travel without ever
themselves physically moving across state lines, the conception of
“engaging” in interstate commerce adopted in these cases was
broader than the conception now used by the majority of lower
201
courts interpreting the FAA.
Thus, the term “engaged in . . . commerce” should not impose
the requirement that rideshare drivers must move across state lines
to qualify for the exemption, but rather should encompass the entire stream of commerce. Rideshare drivers, as a class, are a component part of the flow of commerce because they frequently drive
passengers to and from airports, railroad stations, bus stations, and
202
other points of interstate travel. In fact, rideshare drivers are like
the last-mile delivery truck drivers—they mostly travel intrastate,
but are a component part of the passenger’s interstate travel (ei197. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 565 (1870) (holding that a ship that traveled entirely intrastate but that carried goods intended for, and imported from, other states
was “engaged in commerce between the States”).
198. 45 U.S.C. § 51. Because the FELA’s statutory language is almost identical to the
FAA’s, Congress probably had the FELA in mind when drafting the FAA. See Tenney Eng’g,
Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 207 F.2d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 1953);
Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 19. Moreover, when interpreting the FELA after its enactment, courts
needed to determine both whether the railroad-employer was engaged in interstate commerce and whether the injured employee was engaged in interstate commerce. See Mondou
v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 51–52 (1912) (“The present
act . . . deals only with the liability of a carrier engaged in interstate commerce for injuries
sustained by its employees while engaged in such commerce.”). The second prong of this
inquiry—focusing on the injured employee—overlaps with the FAA’s emphasis on workers
engaged in interstate commerce thereby making the early FELA cases relevant in the FAA
context. Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 19–20.
199. Pederson v. Del. Lackawanna, & W. R.R. Co., 229 U.S. 146, 153 (1913).
200. St. Louis, S.F. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Seale, 229 U.S. 156, 161 (1913).
201. See supra Section II.A.3 (explaining that most lower courts require that the worker
move across state lines to qualify for the exemption).
202. For example, in 2019, rideshare platforms provided approximately eight million
rideshare trips to or from Logan Airport in Boston. Rides to or from the airport comprised
about sixteen percent of the total rides with rideshare companies in the Boston area and
about nine percent of rides in all of Massachusetts. Rideshare in Massachusetts: 2019 Data Report, MASS.GOV, https://tnc.sites.digital.mass.gov/#footnotemsg3 [https://perma.cc/DN4FBBS3] (last visited Nov. 10, 2020).
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ther at the beginning of the trip or the end) and are therefore in
the stream of interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court has held that purely local passenger transportation can be in the flow of commerce in other contexts. For
example, in United States v. Capital Transit Co., the Court held that
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) could regulate the fares
of a bus line that carried passengers purely within the District of
203
Columbia. The Court reasoned that the bus line’s operations
were “an integral part of interstate movement” because government workers who lived in the District used the bus line either at
204
the beginning or end of their travel to and from work in Virginia.
Furthermore, flow of commerce jurisprudence has rejected efforts to isolate purely local rides when those rides are in the stream
of interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has explained that:
The fact that several different and independent agencies
are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting
entirely in one State, and some acting through two or more
States, does in no respect affect the character of the transaction. To the extent in which each agency acts in that
205
transportation, it is subject to the regulation of Congress.
Also, the FELA cases recognized that the stream of commerce
206
could not be broken down into component parts. Thus, the flow
of commerce includes all the modes of transportation that combine to create interstate movement, even if those modes are purely
intrastate.
Recently, some lower courts have reasoned that intrastate trips
using ridesharing platforms to and from airports and other points
of interstate travel were not in the flow of commerce by pointing to
203. The Supreme Court heard two cases involving the ICC’s jurisdiction over Capital
Transit. See United States v. Capital Transit Co., 325 U.S. 357 (1945) [hereinafter Capital
Transit I]; United States v. Capital Transit Co., 338 U.S. 286 (1949) (per curiam) [hereinafter Capital Transit II]. Initially, Capital Transit operated an intra-District of Columbia bus
and streetcar route, which dropped passengers off at a bus stop in the central business district and was also one of four bus companies to offer passage from the District of Columbia
to Virginia from that bus station. Capital Transit I, 325 U.S. at 359. After the Supreme Court
upheld the ICC’s jurisdiction under this arrangement, Capital Transit stopped operating the
interstate route. See Capital Transit II, 388 U.S. at 288–89. But, in the second case, the Court
found that the change, which meant that Capital Transit only operated purely intrastate
routes, did not take the bus company’s operations out of the stream of commerce. See id. at
290.
204. Capital Transit II, 388 U.S. at 290.
205. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 565 (1870).
206. See Pederson v. Del. Lackawanna, & W. R.R. Co., 229 U.S. 146, 151–52 (1913) (rejecting an argument that “proceeds upon the assumption that interstate commerce by railroad can be separated into several elements, and the nature of each determined regardless
of its relation to others”); see also Finkin, supra note 6, at 294 n.55.
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the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Yellow Cab, Co. In
that case, decided in 1947, the Court held that transportation between two rail stations in Chicago was in the flow of commerce and
covered under the Sherman Act, but taxicab transportation from
hotels, businesses, and residences to rail stations was not in the
208
flow of commerce. Even at the time, however, this strict boundary separating intrastate movement between rail stations and intrastate movement to rail stations was arbitrary and lacked any coher209
ent principle.
Lower courts have drawn even more arbitrary lines. Some courts
have held that taxi companies that offer pre-scheduled trips to the
airport are in the flow of commerce, while others have held that
companies that have a special arrangement with an airport, railroad station, or other mode of interstate travel are in interstate
210
commerce. When applied to rideshare drivers, this line of reasoning does not hold up because rideshare platforms can meet all
of these distinctions. Indeed, it would be an impossible task for
courts to inquire as to how many Uber rides are between railroad
stations and airports, or how many Uber rides to the airport are
pre-scheduled. And the task is further complicated by the fact that
the FAA requires courts to analyze the class of workers to which the
211
worker belongs, rather than the worker as an individual.
Finally, there is room to expand the exemption beyond its current scope without making its reach coextensive with the full reach
of Congress’s commerce power. The category of workers that “affect” interstate commerce is much different than those workers
212
who are in the flow of commerce. Certain back-office employees

207. See Rogers v. Lyft, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 904, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Capriole v. Uber
Techs., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 3d 919, 931–32 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
208. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 228–34 (1947), overruled on other
grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
209. See John A. Yeager, Antitrust Law—“Incidental Effect” and Jurisdiction Under the Sherman
Act, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 965 (1975) (arguing that the Yellow Cab Court “arbitrarily” placed a
boundary on the flow of commerce); Milton A. Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act,
1959 DUKE L.J. 236, 251–53 (explaining that the Yellow Cab Court “failed completely to analyze all of the issues,” making the decision “of uncertain meaning and questionable soundness”).
210. See, e.g., Exec. Town & Country Servs., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 789 F.2d 1523, 1525–
26 (11th Cir. 1986); Packard v. Pittsburgh Transp. Co., 418 F.3d 246, 256–58 (3d Cir. 2005).
211. Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 226 (3d Cir. 2019) (remanding the case to
the district court to determine whether the plaintiff belongs to a class of workers engaged in
interstate commerce).
212. For example, courts have held that when a good or passenger comes to rest, it is no
longer in the flow of commerce. See supra text accompanying notes 125–27. Yet even an object or action that is completely “at rest,” and therefore not in the flow of commerce, can
still “affect” commerce. See Kevin S. Anderson, The Confusing World of Interstate Commerce and
Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act – A Look at the Development and Future of the Currently Deployed
Jurisdictional Tests, 21 VILL. L. REV. 721, 733 (1976).
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at transportation companies may substantially affect commerce.
But these employees are not also in the flow of commerce since,
unlike the actual drivers at these companies, they do not actively
participate in the stream of transportation that gets the passenger
or goods from one point to another. Thus, the courts need not be
worried about running afoul of Circuit City’s holding that only
transportation workers are included in the exemption, because the
flow of commerce understanding of the exemption would not
reach back-office employees at transportation companies or work213
ers outside of the transportation context.
D. Exclusion of Rideshare Drivers from the FAA as a Positive Policy
Outcome
As a policy matter, rideshare drivers should be exempt from arbitration because it can adversely affect workers and hinder regulatory schemes designed to protect their interests. To start, most
employment contracts are contracts of adhesion, whereby employ214
ees have very little bargaining power to negotiate specific terms.
Arbitration agreements in standard-form contracts rob the courts
215
of their role in enforcing statutory rights. Indeed, the drafters of
the FAA recognized that arbitration could be unfair in certain employment contracts where the parties do not have equal bargaining
power. At the 1923 hearings on the proposed arbitration bill, Senator Walsh of Montana stated that:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these
contracts that are entered into are really not voluntarily
things at all . . . . You can take that or you can leave it . . . .
It is the same with a good many contracts of employment. A
man says “These are our terms. All right, take it or leave it.”
Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to sign it;
and then he surrenders his right to have his case tried by

213. See supra Section II.A.3 (discussing the link between the requirement that the worker be in the transportation industry and their connection to interstate commerce).
214. Black’s Law Dictionary defines adhesion contracts as “standard-form contract[s]
prepared by one party, to be signed by another party in a weaker position . . . who adheres
to the contract with little choice about the terms.” Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
215. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631,
1633 (2005).
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the court, and has to have it tried before tribunal in which
216
he has no confidence at all.
Some scholars have suggested that the drafters of the FAA never
meant to include adhesion contracts within the scope of the Act
because of the unequal bargaining power between the two par217
ties. At the very least, the drafter’s concerns should make courts
more skeptical of enforcing arbitration clauses in situations where
the bargaining power between the parties may be unequal, such as
standard employment contracts used by ridesharing platforms.
Furthermore, for rideshare drivers, arbitration often comes with
class action waivers precluding workers from banding together to
sue the company in arbitration. For example, Uber includes an arbitration clause with a class action waiver in its employment con218
tracts. Mandating individual arbitration makes it more difficult
for Uber’s employees to bring suit when the value of their individ219
ual claims are small. This effectively diminishes the opportunity
for Uber drivers to use the public court system to hold Uber ac220
countable and enforce the law.
Perhaps because of the inequities discussed above, arbitration
may have harmful consequences in individual cases. Arbitrators
may be biased towards companies, like Uber or Lyft, who appear
221
frequently before them. Not surprisingly, employees fare much
worse in arbitration than they do in litigation. Data from 2013 to

216. 1923 Hearings at 9 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt). Julius Henry Cohen, another ABA
member who was integral in advancing the FAA through Congress, expressed similar reservations about adhesion contracts during Congressional hearings in 1924. See 1924 Hearings
at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
217. See Moses, supra note 146, at 107. Modern-day proponents of arbitration clauses in
standard form contracts point out that these provisions often allow employees to opt out of
the arbitration agreement and, further, that employees need not enter into the contracts at
all. E.g., Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 201 (1998) (arguing that consumers still enter into standard form contracts voluntarily). Indeed, Uber has discontinued
its use of mandatory arbitration for its drivers—the company now allows its employees to
opt-out of arbitration within thirty days of signing their contract with the ridesharing company. See Capriole v. Uber Techs., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 3d 919, 923–26 (N.D. Cal. 2020). But
even allowing employees to opt out of the agreement ignores the practical reality of the situation. It is unrealistic to assume that an individual rideshare driver will even read the contract he signs when he starts working for a ridesharing platform.
218. See Capriole, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 923–26 (explaining that Uber’s arbitration agreement also includes a class action waiver).
219. See generally Jeremy McManus, Note, A Motion to Compel Changes to Federal Arbitration
Law: How to Remedy the Abuses Consumers Face when Arbitrating Disputes, 37 B.C. J.L. & SOC.
JUST. 177, 180–81 (2017) (discussing the unfairness of mandatory individual arbitration in
the consumer context).
220. Sternlight, supra note 215, at 1633.
221. See McManus, supra note 219; Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat
Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL. J. 189, 208–13 (1997) (concluding that outcomes for
employees are worse when the employer is a “repeat player” in arbitration).
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2017 from the American Arbitration Association shows that employees were awarded monetary damages in only 1.8% of arbitra222
tion cases. When employees do win, the monetary awards tend to
223
be much lower than those given in litigation.
These harmful byproducts of arbitration can also have a corrosive effect on federal regulatory schemes as a whole. In the employment context, litigation of individual disputes plays an im224
portant role in vindicating broader public policy goals.
Remediation of individual wrongs allows a plaintiff to act as a “private attorney general” by deterring potential wrongdoers, educating the public about their rights and obligations, creating prece225
dent and developing uniform law, and shaping public values.
Private arbitration of disputes mitigates the effectiveness of individual litigation in three ways. First, arbitration is often confidential, meaning that only the parties to the dispute are aware of the
226
ultimate outcomes. This secrecy hampers general deterrence
227
goals and does little to educate the public about the law. Second,
and relatedly, the development of precedent is hampered because
arbitrators do not formulate legal rules and obligations applicable
228
to other parties or the public as a whole. Finally, public adjudication “imparts a sense of right and wrong, of acceptable and unac229
ceptable conduct” in a way that private arbitration simply cannot.
Thus, arbitration between ridesharing companies and their drivers
harms the individual workers involved, and can have broader negative effects on the public justice systems upon which statutory employment regulation schemes depend.

222. Alexia Fernández Campbell & Alvin Chang, There’s a Good Chance You’ve Waived the
Right to Sue Your Boss, VOX (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/1/16992362/
sexual-harassment-mandatory-arbitration [https://perma.cc/8HYE-XV4S].
223. Alexander Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and
Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (finding that median awards in employment litigation are around five to ten times greater than median awards in employment arbitration).
224. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law,
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 422 (1999) (“The achievement of the public goal depends upon
the success of individuals in redressing their injury. And the individual’s interest in remediation gains legitimacy and support from the public policy goals of the statutes.”).
225. Id. at 426–27; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 261 (1979) (arguing that the court system plays a critical
role in formulating rules with future effect and that this function is stifled by private dispute
resolution).
226. Moohr, supra note 224, at 431.
227. Id. at 432.
228. Id. at 435.
229. Id. at 438; see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984)
(explaining that adjudication of disputes “explicates and gives force to the values embodied
in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes”).
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CONCLUSION
The FAA, as originally enacted, was a procedural statute applicable only in federal court. As the jurisprudence interpreting the
FAA evolved, the scope of law widened. To accommodate this widening, courts have narrowly interpreted the section 1 exemption to
only include those who (1) work in the transportation industry, (2)
move goods, and (3) physically move across state lines. This interpretation excludes rideshare drivers who bring suit against their
employers. The narrow conception of the exemption is inconsistent with the legislative history of the FAA, inapposite to the historical understanding of its text, and violative of the public policy
reasons for statutorily regulating labor relationships. Courts should
instead interpret the exemption to be congruent with the text and
history of the FAA. This interpretation would include passenger
centric drivers who are in the flow of commerce within the scope
of section 1, exempting rideshare drivers from the FAA.

